As the threats to Germany and the European war have become increasingly evident, opinions have changed. Chamberlain was awarded for his role as one of the „Men of Munich” in books such as the Guilty Men of 1940. A rare defence of the wartime accord came in 1944 from Viscount Maugham, who had been the Lord`s chancellor. Maugham regarded the decision to establish a Czechoslovakian state with large German and Hungarian minorities as a „dangerous experiment” in the face of previous disputes and described the agreement, which stemmed mainly from the need for France to free itself from its contractual obligations in the face of its vagueness to war.  After the war, Churchill`s memoirs of that time, The Gathering Storm (1948), claimed that Chamberlain`s appeasement of Hitler had been wrong in Munich, and noted Churchill`s pre-war warnings about Hitler`s plan of attack and Britain`s folly of disarmament after Germany reached air parity with Britain. While acknowledging that Chamberlain was acting for noble reasons, Churchill argued that Hitler should have resisted in Czechoslovakia and that efforts had to be made to involve the Soviet Union. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy and his advisers agreed that this was a „Munich moment” – that it was the right place and that it was the right time to prevent the Soviets from placing nuclear missiles at a slight strike distance from the American continent. Unlike Chamberlain in Munich, Kennedy knew in 1962 that the United States had the military strength to make the U.S.S.R.A. the best in Cuba when that happens. But in the war room, Kennedy had to refine the loudest cry of the Munich analogy, General Curtis LeMay, Chief of the Air Staff, who insisted that diplomacy be of no use in resolving the crisis and that the right response was to drop atomic bombs in Cuba.
The Munich Agreement (Czech: Mnichovska dohoda); in Slovak: Mnechovska dohoda; in German: Munchner Abkommen) or Munchner Verrat (Czech: Mnichovska zrada; The Slovak: Mnechovska zrada) was an agreement reached on 30 September 1938 in Munich by Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, the Third French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy. It granted Germany the „transfer of the German territory of the Sudetenland” from Czechoslovakia.  Most of Europe celebrated the agreement because it prevented the war threatened by Adolf Hitler by allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland by Nazi Germany, a region of Western Czechoslovakia inhabited by more than 3 million people, mainly German-speaking. Hitler declared that this was his last territorial claim in Europe, and the choice seemed to lie between war and appeasement. Meanwhile, the British government has asked Benea to ask for a mediator. As he did not want to sever his government`s relations with Western Europe, the heirs reluctantly agreed. The British appointed Lord Runciman, the former Liberal cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on 3 August to convince Benes to accept an acceptable plan for the Sudeten Germans.  On 20 July, Bonnet informed the Czechoslovakian ambassador in Paris that France, while publicly declaring its support for the Czechoslovakian negotiations, was not prepared to go to war on the Sudetenland.  In August, the German press was full of stories of Czechoslovakian atrocities against the Sudeten Germans, with the intention of forcing the West to put pressure on the Czechoslovakians to make concessions.
 Hitler hoped that the Czechoslovaks would refuse and that the West would feel morally justified in abandoning the Czechoslovaks to their fate.  In August, Germany sent 750,000 troops along the border with Czechoslovakia, officially as part of military maneuvers.   On September 4 or 5, Erbe presented the fourth plan, which met almost all of the requirements of the agreement.